#Enigma ww2 code#
#Enigma ww2 series#
#Enigma ww2 free#

In the early phases of the war, particularly during the eight-month Phoney War, the Germans could transmit most of their messages using land lines and so had no need to use radio. Most Ultra intelligence was derived from reading radio messages that had been encrypted with cipher machines, complemented by material from radio communications using traffic analysis and direction finding.

#Enigma ww2 free#

As stated by historian Thomas Haigh, 'The British code-breaking effort of the Second World War, formerly secret, is now one of the most celebrated aspects of modern British history, an inspiring story in which a free society mobilized its intellectual resources against a terrible enemy.' Sources of intelligence In fact he was reading his mail.' Over time, Ultra has become embedded in the public consciousness and Bletchley Park has become a significant visitor attraction. When he put Rommel's picture up in his caravan he wanted to be seen to be almost reading his opponent's mind. For example, Andrew Roberts, writing in the 21st century, states, 'Because he had the invaluable advantage of being able to read Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Enigma communications, General Bernard Montgomery knew how short the Germans were of men, ammunition, food and above all fuel. Since the Ultra story was widely disseminated by Winterbotham in 1974, historians have altered the historiography of World War II.

The existence of Ultra was kept secret for many years after the war. Sir Harry Hinsley, Bletchley Park veteran and official historian of British Intelligence in World War II, made a similar assessment of Ultra, saying that while the Allies would have won the war without it, 'the war would have been something like two years longer, perhaps three years longer, possibly four years longer than it was.' However, Hinsley and others have emphasized the difficulties of counterfactual history in attempting such conclusions, and some historians, such as Keegan, have said the shortening might have been as little as the three months it took the United States to deploy the atomic bomb. Eisenhower, at war's end describing Ultra as having been 'decisive' to Allied victory. Winterbotham quoted the western Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Winston Churchill was reported to have told King George VI, when presenting to him Stewart Menzies (head of the Secret Intelligence Service and the person who controlled distribution of Ultra decrypts to the government): 'It is thanks to the secret weapon of General Menzies, put into use on all the fronts, that we won the war!' F. Many observers, at the time and later, regarded Ultra as immensely valuable to the Allies. However, Ultra also encompassed decrypts of the German Lorenz SZ 40/42 machines that were used by the German High Command, and the Hagelin machine. The term 'Ultra' has often been used almost synonymously with ' Enigma decrypts'. Used properly, the German military Enigma would have been virtually unbreakable in practice, shortcomings in operation allowed it to be broken. Much of the German cipher traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine.

used the codename Magic for its decrypts from Japanese sources, including the ' Purple' cipher. Information obtained through code-breaking was often attributed to the human intelligence from the Boniface network.

#Enigma ww2 series#

In order to ensure that the successful code-breaking did not become apparent to the Germans, British intelligence created a fictional MI6 master spy, Boniface, who controlled a fictional series of agents throughout Germany.

#Enigma ww2 code#

The code name Boniface was used as a cover name for Ultra. Several other cryptonyms had been used for such intelligence. The name arose because the intelligence obtained was considered more important than that designated by the highest British security classification then used ( Most Secret) and so was regarded as being Ultra Secret. Ultra eventually became the standard designation among the western Allies for all such intelligence. Ultra was the designation adopted by British military intelligence in June 1941 for wartime signals intelligence obtained by breaking high-level encrypted enemy radio and teleprinter communications at the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park.